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Meaningful Information, Meaningful 
Retention 
JORDAN M. SINGER† 
Judicial retention elections are at a crossroads. Less 
than twenty years ago, they were seen as relatively sleepy 
affairs, characterized by low voter turnout and little or no 
campaigning. But times have changed. In 2010, high court 
judges in six states were targeted for non-retention by well-
organized and well-financed opposition groups with overtly 
political agendas.1 Although these efforts mostly proved 
unsuccessful, anti-retention forces appear to be gaining 
resilience with each election cycle.2 Once heralded as a 
relatively apolitical means of ensuring judicial 
accountability, retention elections now face an uncertain 
future. 
In his recent Article, Professor Todd Pettys suggests 
that we may have reached a breaking point.3 Briefly 
summarized, his contention is this: modern anti-retention 
campaigns are particularly powerful because they are able 
to tap into voters’ moral outrage over controversial court 
  
† Assistant Professor of Law, New England Law | Boston. I am grateful to 
Tigran Eldred, Lawrence Friedman, and Louis Schulze for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
 1. See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate 
Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 118 (2010). 
 2. See ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2009-
10, at 27 (2011) (“More assaults on impartial courts, taking a range of different 
forms, are on the horizon.”). 
 3. Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention Elections, the Rule of Law, and the 
Rhetorical Weaknesses of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 78 (2012). 
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decisions.4 That outrage, in the form of a moral mandate, 
overpowers the public’s general deference to the courts as 
fair and impartial arbiters of the law, making voters more 
willing to remove judges who issue controversial decisions.5 
Moreover, the traditional arguments in favor of judicial 
retention—that judges should not be punished at election 
time for doing their jobs (the “deontological argument”)6 and 
that judges should not feel pressure to reach politically 
popular (rather than legally correct) outcomes (the 
“consequentialist argument”)7—prove ineffective with 
morally outraged voters. In short, the dynamics of retention 
elections have changed, and the pro-retention arguments 
that may have resonated with the public a generation ago 
no longer work. Using the unsuccessful 2010 retention bids 
of three Iowa Supreme Court Justices as one recent 
example of the weakness of traditional arguments, Pettys 
concludes that retention elections should either be 
reimagined as staging grounds for vibrant policy debates 
over case outcomes, or simply eliminated altogether.8 
Professor Pettys’s Article offers a highly instructive 
account of the way that traditional pro-retention arguments 
fall short in the face of moral mandates. That account, 
however, only tells part of the story. And it is the rest of the 
story—comprising voter concerns about procedural fairness 
and the proper role of the judiciary, and the equivalent 
failure of traditional pro-retention arguments to address 
those concerns—that provides a clearer guide for the future 
of retention elections. This Response offers an alternative 
reading of the 2010 elections—the Iowa election in 
particular—and suggests the pro-retention forces should 
worry less about responding to moral mandates and more 
about bolstering the public’s faith in the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary.  
Social science research has identified two factors that 
drive voter decision-making in retention elections. First, 
citizens typically view judicial legitimacy and accountability 
in sociological terms, meaning that they expect judges first 
  
 4. Id. at 127-30. 
 5. Id. at 130-32. 
 6. Id. at 89-93. 
 7. Id. at 93-99. 
 8. Id. at 78. 
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and foremost to embrace fair, neutral, and trustworthy 
procedures,9 and resist any invitation to overstep the court’s 
limited constitutional role.10 At the same time, retention 
voters are rationally ignorant, meaning that they generally 
will not invest much (if any) time to learn about their 
sitting judges before going to the polls.11 Instead, most 
voters will simply assume as a default that judges are 
acting in a procedurally fair and institutionally sound 
manner unless presented with information to the contrary.12 
Together, these strains of reasoning typically work to keep 
incumbent judges in office. So strong is the presumption 
that incumbent judges are competent, fair, and trustworthy 
that only pervasive evidence of dereliction of these qualities 
will spur a successful non-retention vote.13 
A controversial case outcome may be seen as evidence of 
such dereliction, at least to some voters in some 
circumstances. As Professor Pettys points out, if a person 
finds a case outcome to be morally outrageous, her view of 
the court’s commitment to fairness and trustworthiness 
may diminish, and she may feel an incentive to replace the 
sitting judge(s) with new judges whose moral compasses are 
  
 9. See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in 
Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2007) (“[Procedural fairness] 
is a value that the American public expects and demands from judges . . . .”); see 
also Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion 
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 786 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, 
Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular 
United States Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
621, 627 (1991) (finding that, despite unpopular Supreme Court decisions, most 
people believe that the Court follows fair procedures in making its decisions). 
 10. Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2002) (“[T]he gravamen of the [judicial activism] charge is 
not simply that the Court is getting things wrong on the merits, but that it has 
somehow overstepped its institutional role.”). 
 11. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter 
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1141, 1153-54 (2003); Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions 
in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 257-58 (2006). 
 12. I have developed this observation in more detail elsewhere. See Jordan M. 
Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1937742. 
 13. Id. 
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similar to her own.14 Pettys suggests that this type of “moral 
mandate” was at work in the 2010 Iowa judicial retention 
election: an angry electorate, brimming with moral outrage 
over the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the 
state’s Defense of Marriage Act, ousted three Justices who 
sought retention.15 This view reflects the now-conventional 
wisdom about the Iowa retention election. But there is more 
to the story. 
The historical facts are plain enough. In April 2009, the 
Iowa Supreme Court unanimously held in Varnum v. Brien 
that state legislation restricting marriage to one man and 
one woman violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa 
Constitution.16 The decision angered many conservative and 
religious groups in Iowa (and nationwide), who pledged to 
override the ruling through political and non-political 
means.17 However, political avenues against same-sex 
marriage in Iowa quickly dried up when Governor Chet 
Culver and the state legislature ruled out support for a 
marriage amendment to the state constitution.18 Anger over 
the Varnum decision accordingly coalesced into a campaign 
to oppose the three Supreme Court Justices who would be 
seeking retention in November 2010. After a bitter 
campaign in which proponents spent $400,000 to retain the 
Justices and opponents spent twice that to unseat them,19 
all three Justices fell short of the threshold needed for 
retention.20  
  
 14. Pettys, supra note 3, at 131-32. 
 15. Id. at 70. 
 16. 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). 
 17. See Schotland, supra note 1, at 120-21. 
 18. See Mike Glover, Iowa Gov Cool to Attempting Gay-Marriage Reversal, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 7, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
huff-wires/20090407/iowa-gay-marriage/; Rod Boshart, Culver Praises Legis-
lature for Not Taking Up Gay Marriage, SIOUX CITY J. (Mar. 31, 2010, 2:14 PM), 
http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/article_c0ecb378-3cf9-
11df-8dd0-001cc4c002e0.html. 
 19. Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, 2010 Judicial Elections Increase 
Pressure on Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010-110 
310-final.pdf. 
 20. Schotland, supra note 1, at 120. 
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Moral outrage unquestionably fed the anti-retention 
campaign in Iowa, but moral mandates alone cannot explain 
the election result. The numbers simply don’t add up. A 
statewide survey taken shortly before oral argument in the 
Varnum case found that only 32% of Iowans opposed same-
sex marriage in any form, with 28% supporting same-sex 
marriage, and another 30% opposing marriage but 
supporting civil unions.21 In other words, less than one-third 
of Iowans were predisposed to experience the deep and 
strongly held moral outrage over same-sex marriage that 
would be necessary to overcome the baseline inclination 
that the court’s decision was procedurally legitimate.22 Yet 
54% of Iowa voters chose not to retain the Justices. Some 
factor other than moral outrage was necessary for the anti-
retention movement to succeed on a statewide scale.23 
That additional factor was not a moral concern, but a 
sociological one: the widespread belief that the Iowa 
Supreme Court had overstepped its institutional role in 
directly legalizing same-sex marriage. This perception was 
fueled by anti-retention forces, whose primary theme 
throughout the campaign was not “Varnum was wrong for 
moral reasons” but rather “Varnum was wrong for 
institutional reasons.”24 Indeed, a study of letters to editor 
  
 21. Press Release, Univ. of Iowa, Big Ten Battleground Poll: Iowans’ Views 
on Gay Marriage and Civil Unions 1 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://news-
releases.uiowa.edu/2008/november/112508gaymarriagetopline.pdf. 
 22. See Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral 
Conviction, 2 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37 (2002) (describing a 
moral mandate as “a strong attitude with an equally strong moral investment”). 
 23. The level of support for same-sex marriage in Iowa in the pre-Varnum 
poll was not an anomaly, but part of a trend toward greater acceptance of same-
sex marriage in Iowa. A 2010 poll, taken well after Varnum, but before the 
retention election, found that support for same-sex marriage in the state had 
grown to 44%. See Andrew Gelman et al., Over Time, a Gay Marriage 
Groundswell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK3. Similarly, a poll from August 
2011 found that only 29% of Iowans opposed same-sex marriage in any form, 
while 40% supported gay marriage and another 30% supported civil unions. See 
Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Iowans Up on Gay Marriage and Branstad 
(Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/PPP 
_Release_IA_0826.pdf. 
 24. See Tyler J. Buller, Framing the Debate: Understanding Iowa’s 2010 
Judicial Retention Election Through a Content Analysis of Letters to the Editor, 
97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 22), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793313. 
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appearing in Iowa newspapers prior to the election found 
that nearly 70% of anti-retention letters argued against 
Varnum based on institutional overreach themes like 
“usurping the will of the people” and “legislating from the 
bench.”25 By contrast, less than 12% of anti-retention letters 
derided Varnum for religious or moral reasons.26 The 
messaging of the anti-retention forces in Iowa, then, was 
much more sophisticated and richly textured than a simple 
tap into the reservoir of moral outrage or an appeal to 
sacred values. The middle ground of voters did not need to 
be morally outraged by Varnum to cast a vote against the 
three Justices; they merely needed to believe that the Court 
had improperly assumed the responsibility of the legislature 
in effectuating an important social policy. 
In the face of this institutional critique, the traditional 
arguments offered by pro-retention forces were doomed to 
fail. Supporters of retention argued that the Court was 
simply “doing its job”27 and that a vote against retention was 
“a vote against the judicial system.”28 But these 
deontological arguments did not—and could not—resonate 
with voters who viewed the court as overstepping its 
constitutional bounds. In other words, saying that judges 
should not be fired for doing their jobs will not work if 
voters perceive those judges as not doing their jobs, but 
instead intruding into the proper domain of the legislature. 
Similarly, consequentialist arguments lack rhetorical power 
in light of concerns about sociological accountability because 
the public generally believes that judges should be held 
accountable for procedural fairness and upholding the 
ideals of the court as an institution. Put differently, if 
  
 25. Id. (manuscript at 22-23). 
 26. Id. (manuscript at 22). Pettys cites to this study, but conflates the 
arguments, noting merely that “more than 85% of the anti-retention letter-
writers condemned Varnum in one manner or another . . . .” Pettys, supra note 
3, at 85. But the nature of the condemnation is the key to understanding the 
motivation for a non-retention vote. 
 27. Pettys, supra note 3, at 90 (quoting Rob Potts, Letter to the Editor, 
Justices Did Not “Make Law;” They Interpreted It, OTTUMWA COURIER ONLINE 
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://ottumwacourier.com/letters/x693285242/Justices-did-not-
make-law-they-interpreted-it). 
 28. Id. (quoting Alan L. Egly, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Vote Against Judge 
Based on Self-Interest, Ideology, QUAD-CITIES ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.qconline.com/archives/qco/display.php?id=516205). 
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judges are so independent that they disregard the very 
procedures and institutional arrangements that are 
designed to ensure fair and accurate outcomes, those judges 
should be replaced—or at least should feel pressure to 
change their behavior in the face of public disapproval.  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the perception of 
the Iowa Supreme Court’s institutional overreach was 
actually grounded in reality. Indeed, any fair reading of the 
Varnum opinion shows it to be cautious and carefully 
constructed, demonstrating an explicit awareness of the 
limited role of the judiciary in a government premised on 
the separation of powers. But surely most Iowa voters did 
not read the court’s opinion. As rationally ignorant voters, 
they instead relied on information that could be obtained 
passively or with little effort, and most of that “information” 
consisted of the opposition’s relentless drumbeat of judicial 
activism and warnings that the Justices were “legislating 
from the bench.” In the end, the middle ground voters who 
would eventually decide the election swung against the 
three Justices not because of moral outrage, but because 
they had become convinced that the Justices had not met 
their commitment to sociological accountability. 
The dynamics of voter decision-making based on 
sociological accountability illustrate both the strengths and 
the limitations of the “fairness and impartiality” rhetoric 
that characterizes traditional pro-retention arguments. 
Given public concern that their courts remain fair, 
impartial, and unwilling to succumb to the temptation of 
institutional overreach, it is of course essential that pro-
retention forces remind voters that their incumbent judges 
embrace these qualities. But merely asserting fairness and 
impartiality is no longer enough. Such qualities must also 
be demonstrated to the public. 
And therein lies the key to the future of judicial 
retention elections. Voters are hungry for information 
concerning their judges’ commitment to procedural fairness 
and tendency to avoid institutional overreach. Pro-retention 
forces historically have not bothered to supply such 
information to voters, because in an information vacuum, 
most rationally ignorant voters will adopt the default 
position that judges are good enough to retain. But anti-
retention forces are now filling that vacuum, and voters will 
gravitate toward any easily accessible information, accurate 
or not. Pro-retention forces can no longer rely on the lack of 
meaningful information to do their work for them. They 
8 THE DOCKET [Vol. 60  
must be prepared to provide substantial information on 
judges’ sociological accountability early and often in the 
election cycle.  
The ongoing relevance of sociological accountability to 
voters—both with respect to campaign rhetoric and with 
respect to concrete information on the performance of 
sitting judges—is not just theoretical. The 2010 election 
season saw more efforts to unseat state high court justices 
than perhaps ever before.29 Anti-retention forces in Alaska, 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Kansas pushed for removal 
of one or more jurists, and in many states the push was 
sparked by a single court decision on a controversial issue.30 
Yet in every state except Iowa, the justices were retained, 
many by comfortable margins.31 Several factors likely 
contributed to this discrepancy, but the ready availability of 
information on judges’ commitment to sociological 
accountability in the other states clearly played a 
significant role. Most obviously, states like Alaska, 
Colorado, and Kansas enjoyed robust state-sponsored 
judicial performance evaluation (“JPE”) programs, which 
expressly review each judge’s performance with respect to 
procedural fairness factors like clarity of communication, 
demonstrated impartiality, judicial temperament, integrity, 
and administrative capacity, and place the results in voter 
guides prior to the election.32 JPE programs also inquire 
about judicial humility and each judge’s commitment to 
deciding only issues that are properly within the court’s 
jurisdiction and institutional role.33 Unfortunately, the Iowa 
  
 29. See Schotland, supra note 1, at 118. 
 30. Larry Aspin, The 2010 Judicial Retention Elections in Perspective: 
Continuity and Change from 1964 to 2010, 94 JUDICATURE 218, 228-29 tbl.3 
(2011) (listing states holding retention elections in 2010 and describing the 
reason for opposition to retention in each state). 
 31. Id.  
 32. See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial 
Performance Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 
200, 203-05 (2007) (listing states with JPE programs, including Alaska, 
Colorado, and Kansas, and noting that Alaska and Colorado have two of the 
most developed JPE programs). 
 33. For example, the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation Program 
asks attorneys to evaluate appellate judges on, among other things, each judge’s 
commitment to “[r]efraining from reaching issues that need not be decided.” 
COLO. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, APPELLATE 
QUESTIONNAIRE, available at http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/ 
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Justices benefitted from no such program, leaving their 
judicial careers exclusively at the mercy of election year 
hype. Perhaps more importantly, the critical swing voters in 
Iowa were forced to rely exclusively on partisan messaging 
with respect to the sociological accountability issues that 
mattered most to them. 
Given the voters’ primary interest in procedural 
fairness and institutional legitimacy and the ongoing 
potential of JPE programs to provide information relevant 
to those interests, it is not clear that the only choices are to 
either eliminate retention elections altogether or encourage 
sitting judges to engage in external defenses of their 
decisions. If judicial retention voters only cared about case 
outcomes or substantive judicial policymaking, such 
engagement might be appropriate. But most people care 
about the process of judicial decision-making as well as 
outcomes—indeed, typically they care about process much 
more than outcomes. Studies have consistently shown that 
support for appellate courts is linked “to judgments that the 
decisions, whether favorable or unfavorable, were made 
using procedures that are competent, reasonable, and 
fair.”34 It is therefore hard to see the benefit of infusing 
retention elections with full-fledged policy debates about the 
wisdom of specific case outcomes. Such debates are unlikely 
to influence a change in position among the minority of 
voters who are driven by a moral mandate, and at the same 
time are likely to erode the court’s legitimacy among voters 
who do not have strongly held moral convictions on the 
issues.  
For related reasons, the proposed elimination of 
retention elections altogether also seems unwise. Even if 
such a move were politically feasible, it would be ill-advised 
because it would deny voters the reasonable opportunity to 
hold their judges accountable for transgressions that voters 
do find important: violations of procedural fairness or lack 
of commitment to protecting and preserving the court’s 
institutional legitimacy. All this is to say that case outcomes 
may drive some non-retention votes in any given election, 




 34. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 786. 
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justify radical changes to retention elections as we know 
them.  
For most voters in most retention elections, judicial 
accountability begins and ends with sociological 
accountability. Has the judge demonstrated a commitment 
to the trappings of procedural fairness—the opportunity for 
all parties to be heard, fair consideration of all the evidence, 
and a clear explanation of the court’s decision? Has the 
judge acted as a trusted public servant and a worthy 
guardian of the court’s institutional legitimacy? The judges 
who show themselves to be knowledgeable, humble, 
impartial, and trustworthy tend to win favor with a 
majority of voters, even when some percentage of the voting 
public strongly disagrees with one or more of their 
decisions.35 By contrast, the judges who are perceived to be 
boorish, haughty, disinterested, unclear, intellectually 
overwhelmed, or unprofessional are far less likely to survive 
a retention bid.36 
We are right to be concerned with many of the recent 
trends in judicial elections. And it is near certain that 
morally outraged groups will continue to seek ouster of 
state judges based on case outcomes for the foreseeable 
future. But the solution, it seems to me, is to return to the 
principles of judicial accountability that already occupy the 
minds of most citizens. Every state with retention elections 
should conduct formal performance evaluations of its judges 
based on criteria related to the process of adjudication, and 
provide those evaluation results to the public in advance of 
the election. If the evaluations are strong, pro-retention 
forces should adopt strategies to remind voters that the 
judge in question has demonstrated a commitment to 
procedural fairness and preserving the legitimacy of the 
court. If the evaluations are poor, all interested parties—
including those who are typically supportive of sitting 
judges—should debate whether the judge really deserves 
retention. In either event, the retention decision will better 
reflect what voters really want in their judges, and will 
  
 35. See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation 
Program for the Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 21 (2008) (providing a 
detailed example of a state judge who was retained despite making a 
controversial, high-profile ruling in an adverse possession case). 
 36. See Aspin, supra note 30, at 225. 
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naturally dissipate some of the concerns about moral 
mandates within a minority of the voting population. 
 
